Turkish Migrant Associations in Germany: Between Integration Pressure and Transnational Linkages by Amelina, Anna & Faist, Thomas
 Revue européenne des migrations
internationales 
vol. 24 - n°2 | 2008
Pratiques transnationales - mobilité et territorialités
Turkish Migrant Associations in Germany:
Between Integration Pressure and Transnational
Linkages
Les associations turques de migrants en Allemagne : entre pression à
l’intégration et liens transnationaux
Las asociaciones de migrantes turcos en Alemania: entre la presión de la
integración y las vinculaciones transnacionales








Date of publication: 1 November 2008





Anna Amelina and Thomas Faist, « Turkish Migrant Associations in Germany: Between Integration
Pressure and Transnational Linkages », Revue européenne des migrations internationales [Online], vol. 24
- n°2 | 2008, Online since 01 November 2011, connection on 03 May 2019. URL : http://
journals.openedition.org/remi/4542  ; DOI : 10.4000/remi.4542 
© Université de Poitiers
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Between Integration Pressure and
Transnational Linkages
Anna AMELINA* and Thomas FAIST**
There is a tension between integration expectations in immigration countries
such as Germany on the one hand and transnational bonds of immigrants on the other
hand. In general, transnational ties of immigrants are seen as detrimental to a
successful integration of migrants into German society. Thus our central research
question is: How do political, economical and religious organizations of Turkish origin
immigrants deal with the nationally defined integration requests? Which political
practices do migrant organizations develop in this area of conflict between trans-
national networks and integration pressure? Political practices are action routines
which are oriented towards obtaining collectively binding political results. We argue
that the public positioning of migrant associations vis-à-vis demands for integration is
part of a two-way process of accommodation involving both migrant organizations and
groups of ‘majority society’.
Usually politicians of the country of immigration regard transnational political
practices of migrants as an integration hindrance, which has of late increasingly been
discussed by German media? (Geißler/Pöttker, 2006). In this connection, a special
interest lies on the changes of the media discussion of “migration” and “migrants”,
which were caused by the creation of the terrorism discourse. The picture produced by
television news of Muslim migrants in Germany has mainly been marked by negativity
since 11th September 2001. The nationalities most frequently mentioned in the context
of news are Moroccan or Turkish (Ruhrmann/Sommer/Uhlemann, 2006: 45). A
characteristic feature of modern television reporting, in contrast to the past ones, is a
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high journalistic level of recognition which can be explained by visualisation. A current
analysis of news reports on German television (Ruhrmann/Sommer/Uhlemann, 2006)
shows that such aspects as damage, conflict and aggression are not necessary used for
thematical connection of terrorism with migration in the reports. Thus, the constant
warnings about suspected extremists living in Germany as well as Islamists
immigrating to Germany make up for a considerable part of news reporting. 
Additionally, the media integration debate in the press is marked by negativity
(Zengingül, 20071). The media especially expounds the problems of integration
intention of immigrants: “Whoever wants to live constantly in Germany has
obligations”. Apart from the mastery of the German language, one has to acknowledge
the basic values of the German society. Especially those migrants who did not learn
about democratic or human rights ideals show the largest amount of integration
deficits. Terms such as “Turks” and “Muslims” are usually used as synonyms. 
We link up to the thesis that transnational ties are harmful for integration in the
immigration country in a specific way. First of all, we assume that migrant organi-
zations in Germany take note of integration requests and are, therefore, likely to deal
with integration pressure (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Rauer, 2008). Second, we
consider that migrant organizations interpret the public integration offers, which
certainly vary for different categories of migrants, in different ways. Thus, the central
research question can be formulated as the following: Which political practices do
migrant organizations develop in this area of tension between actually existing
transnational networks on the one hand and integration pressure into the immigration
country on the other hand? 
Our research is focused on three types of migrant associations – religious,
political and business organizations – whose members are of Turkish background. The
great number of these associations is characterized by transnational linkages. They are
transnational in the sense that they maintain contacts to political representatives in both
countries, Germany and Turkey. The aims and strategies of them are also marked by an
orientation towards political questions in both countries. Although the members of
associations not necessarily circulate between two countries, the decisions about their
political participation depend on their knowledge about two different institutional
political backgrounds. We decided to analyze religious, political and business
associations, because the dominant public integration discourse in German media
primarily addresses these associations (Rauer, 2008). Apart from this, we assume that
these organizations produce the largest amount of political practices concerning
integration requests. In general, political activities, such as demonstrations, public
discussion performances, mass gatherings, representation activities for public
institutions, can be named as the most spread political work of the associations.
Methodologically our research was directed by grounded theory (Strauss, 2007).
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1 Three newspapers – the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ) and
Tageszeitung (TAZ) were analysed in reference to their content, in the time period from
3.11.2004 till 24.1.2004. 
Between 2005 and 2006 ten expert interviews with the representatives of migrant
associations were conducted. Additional sources, like internet-homepages of the
associations were also evaluated (cf. Appendix).
After specifying the theoretical frame of research (cf. 2) we examine the
political activities of religious associations, such as DITIB, AABF, IGMG, (cf. 3).
Thus, the activities of political associations (TGD, DIDF) and economic associations
(ATIAD, Müsiad Berlin, TDU, TD-IHK) of migrants are, therefore, analyzed as well
(cf. 4, 5). The short conclusion completes the paper. 
THEORETICAL FRAME
While media reporting on transnational political practices of migrants is
characterized by the one-sidedness, the sociological debate over the significance of
transnational bonds for integration processes varies. On the one hand, we have
approaches which define migrants` relations to the homeland as a hindrance to
integration, such as the assimilation theory by Esser (2001) and the cultural deficit
approach by Heitmeyer (Heitmeyer at.al., 1997). Both concepts suppose that cultural
adjustment of migrants has to be seen as a condition of structural integration. On the
other hand, there are transnational approaches (Faist, 2000; Koopmans and Statham,
2001; Pries, 2008), which have a more multifaceted view on the connection between
integration and transnational linkages.
Therefore, our research is based on transnational approaches that pay attention
to the ways in which migrant collectives structure their social and symbolic networks
in multiple nation state contexts. Two hypotheses concerning the relation between
integration and transnational linkages are formulated from this theoretical perspective.
The first one is enunciated by Koopmans and Statham (2001) who explore trans-
national activities as a result of institutional state pressure put on migrant collectives.
In their comparative study of migrants` transnational claim-makings in Germany, the
Netherlands and Great Britain Koopmans and Statham argue that national integration
regimes have a strong impact on political activities developed by migrants. For the
German case they point out that both citizenship law and integration regime, which
define migrants as a ‘foreign body’ of nation state, are the central causes for a
comparatively high level of migrants` transnational activities. The formation of so-
called ‘parallel societies’ – e.g. migrant communities which remain to be ‘homeland-
orientated’ – is, from this point of view, a home-made matter. In reverse, one can
assume that the transnational claim-makings are a hint for failed integration caused - in
this case - by nation state opportunities. Concomitantly, this line of argumentation
formulates an “action-reaction” relation between state’s institutional opportunities and
activities of migrant collectives and organizations. 
The second hypothesis regarding the connection between integration and
transnational linkages is based on the assumption that multiply located political
activities are compatible with nation state required integration developments. However,
this position avoids the “action-reaction” or the “stimulus-response” assumption.
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Instead, the second hypothesis prefers an alternative understanding of the term
“integration”. It has to be understood as “positive two-way processes of mutual
accommodation between migrants and their host society” (Tambiah, 2000: 168). The
accommodation can be situated on different levels of societal life: Firstly, one can
observe these processes between institutions of nation states and individuals with
migrational background, and, secondly, one can notice a mutual accommodation
between state institutions and migrant associations – in other words, on the
organizational level.
(Ad 1) The transnational approach suggests that migrants are able, both to
maintain transnational linkages and, at the same time, to acquire necessary (economic,
political, educational etc.) knowledge in order to achieve an inclusion in organizations
and institutions of the ‘majority society’. But the transnational concept indicates that
not only an adjustment on the part of migrants – which should not be confused with
assimilation or acculturation – is necessary to be able to speak of successful
integration, but also an adjustment or rather opening up of state or commercial
organizations for the new category of clients (Faist, 1995). 
(Ad 2) But besides these changes on the individual level, we have to
acknowledge that the formation of migrant associations can also be supportive for two-
way accommodation processes. On the one hand, they represent and address the
collective recognition concerns of migrants to the political authorities. On the other
hand, the public authorities of nation states can voice their integration requests to
representatives of migrant collectives. Subsequently, the formation of terms, strategies,
ideas and rules concerning ‘integration’ does not occur in the top-down-way – e.g.
invented by state and transferred to migrants – but in mutual negotiation processes
which include both parts, institutions of nation state and increasingly organized forms
of migrant collectives (Tränhardt and Hunger, 2003; Jungk, 2000).
Until now migrant associations, which generally can be divided into those
with (ethnically, nationally and religiously) homogeneous and those with hetero-
geneous members, were either regarded as bridges between migrants and locals
(Breton, 1964) or as an expression of collective exclusion (Heitmeyer et. al., 1997). We
think that migrant organizations are agents, which, apart from the cultivation of
transnational bonds, also raise secondary socialization performances which can be
labelled as supportive for a migrant’s inclusion. The majority of migrant organizations
frequently offer, for example, introductory seminars which pass on the institutional
regulations of the immigration country in areas such as economy, politics, health and
education. At the same time, state institutions increasingly cooperate with migrant
associations in order to legitimize their immigrant and minority politics.
This understanding of integration as a two-way process can be defined with
terms of discourse theory (Keller, 2005). From this perspective ‘integration’ gains a
public dimension and can be understood as a public negotiation of social boundaries.
These processes of boundary definition refer to a social construction of ethnic or
religious minorities. Thus, the minority is not an “objectively” existing group but a
result of communicative arguments of at least two groups – a result of social
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comparison (Kneer, 1997). Only the public definition of a social group as an ethnic or
religious minority makes the drawing of the social boundaries possible. However, the
publicly marked minority group does not have the same access to mass media
resources and public situations, in which such definitions are created, as the majority.
Under such circumstances the group defined as minority is forced to voice itself as
such in order to deal with this labelling. It is important to note that on both sides, the
majority and minority groups, only certain social bodies can take part in the ‘definition
struggles’. While on the majority side national authorities have access to powerful
possibilities of definition, migrant associations are the minority side spokespersons in
the public negotiation of social boundaries. In order to be recognized in the public
discourse, the associations have to present the minority as ethnically and religiously
homogeneous2. Only such self-ethnicizing, as well as the self-definition as a minority,
enables the associations to formulate their claims of recognition (Rauer, 2008: 88).
Even though the associations – in contrast to state authorities – have only
restricted access to public definition processes, their political activities cannot solely be
regarded as a reaction to the national integration regime. It can rather be assumed that
the dominant integration conditions and integration requests are influenced by the
associations. From this perspective associations are not passive receiving agents of
state conditioned institutional opportunities, but co-constructors of the integration
discourse. 
To sum up, the article focuses on research results concerning the organi-
zational statements of migrant associations given in the context of the current German
integration debate. Concomitantly, the article points out in which way migrant
associations connect public statements with the public articulation of their trans-
national linkages. Finally, we want to describe what kind of public is addressed by
migrant associations in both countries – Germany and Turkey. 
POLITICAL TOPICS, POSITIONS AND STRATEGIES OF
TURKISH RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATIONS 
Turkish-Islamic Union of the Presidency of Religious Affairs
(Diyanet Isleri Türk Islam Birligi / DITIB)
DITIB is the largest Muslim umbrella organization in Germany. The head
office, to which 870 Mosque associations are incorporated into, is in Cologne. The
umbrella organization was founded by the Committee for Religious Matter (Diyanet
IÒleri Baskanligi) in 1984. They wanted to ensure that the practicing of religious duties
in the European states would not be left to radical organizations. According to a
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2 Here group identity is not understood as the sum of constant primordialist characteristics of a
social group, but as a socially constructed definition which the group members accept as self-
definition (Reckwitz, 2001 : 22).
Turkish law from 1963, the committee of the DITIB acknowledges the system of
religious belief “Diyanet”. From a theological perspective “Diyanet” covers three
dimensions of Islamic religiosity: Ibadet (rite), Itikat (religious belief) and Ahlak
(morals, morality).
The services of DITIB are mainly directed to Turkish Muslims, even though
the association is actually open for all kinds of Muslim. The imams working for the
DITIB are civil servants of the Turkish state, who are sent from Turkey for a limited
time period. The activities of DITIB are of interest for the research on transnational
practices because this example shows that they not only create opportunity structures
for transnational activities but can also act as transnational players. However, the
assumption that DITIB acts as a state authorities is not quite correct. From a legal
perspective DITIB is an independent association founded in Germany. The excerpt
from an interview with the general secretary of DITIB, Mehmet Yıldırım, published in
the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung newspaper (2005), illustrates the ambiguous
relationship of the association with the Turkish state:
“First of all – we don’t represent the Diyanet in Ankara but we closely work
together concerning one matter. We ask the Diyanet for imams because up to this
point they cannot be trained in Germany. They preach at our mosques and stay in
Germany for three to four years. We are not a foreign country organization of the
Diyanet but an umbrella organization founded in accordance with the German law
of association. I am not a member of the Diyanet, and, just as, except for one
exception, neither are our board members.”3
Since its foundation, the political activities of DITIB were rather marginal.
This has to do with a specific kind of religiousness which does not need any public
representation when articulating its belief. This specific religiousness does not connect
the belief and its public representation. In opposite, the political representation regime
marked by Christianity only defines the publicly represented belief as authentic
(Tezcan, 2005). Therefore, DITIB did not initially formulate a political catalogue of
demands directed to the German public. However, after gaining experiences with the
German political representation regime and the growing public pressure after 9/11, the
DITIB started to voice itself politically. To put it into other words, the institutional
pressure for public representation of authentic belief, which has grown after 9/11, has
changed the way the DITIB deals with the German public. Thus, DITIB’s political
activities, whose main emphasis is clearly on Germany, can be described as public
discussion performances. The addressees of the public statements of the DITIB are in
particular German government authorities as well as media public. The majority of
activities consists of reactions to public debates related to “Islamist” acts of violence.
After the world-wide well-known terrorist attacks as well as the murder of Theo van
Gogh in the Netherlands, the expectation has been institutionalised in Germany that
Muslim groups have to publicly distance themselves from them. Our main interest is
not the question whether this expectation of a distancing is legitimate, but rather the
mechanism institutionalised through this expectation. 
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3 Cf. Interview with the chairman of DITIB Mehmet Yıldırım, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung, Date: 09.02.2005.
On the one hand, a regular request of distancing institutionalises the suspicion
against Islam. On the other hand, every single Muslim immigrant has to position
himself in relation to his/her belief. This not only leads to a mistrustful examination of
the link between Muslim immigrants and “their” associations with a fine-toothed
comb, furthermore, it leads to a Muslim common ground: the Umma always sworn by
Muslims, the community of Muslims, they are now reproached with. Owing to the
public request, the pressure for a public representation of authentic belief can no longer
be ignored by the DITIB. Thus, the DITIB does not only have to issue press statements
but also organize demonstrations (e.g. the DITIB’s demonstration in Cologne in 2004)
in order to distance itself from act of terrorism in the name of Islam (Tezcan, 2007).
Apart from intensified political articulations, a close cooperation between
DITIB and other Islamic organizations in Germany can be observed after 2001.
Subsequently, DITIB takes part in the so-called Islamic conference, which has been
organized by the federal Home Office since 2006; additional meetings were held in
2007 and are planned for 2008. These events aim to give both, the German state
authorities and the representatives of different Muslim associations, the possibility to
discuss questions related to religion, Islamism and integration problems of migrants4.
One of the central issues of this initiative is the clarification of problems referring to
the split between state and religion in Germany. Aside of this, the first Islamic
conference (2006) meant to unite various Muslim associations to one contact
organization. From the state’s point of view, it has to represent the interests of all
Muslims living in Germany. This organization was named the “Coordination
Committee of Muslims”. It connects DITIB with other Muslim associations, such as
the “Islam Council” and the “Central Committee of Muslims”5.
DITIB took also part in the Integration Summit which was initiated by the
Federal Home Office 20066. The aim of this meeting, which included both, the
representatives of the German authorities and of migrant associations, was the
development of a so-called “National Integration Plan”. Moreover, working groups
dealing with relevant integration issues, such as a) “integration courses”, b) “German
language”, c) “education, apprenticeship, apprenticeship market”, d) “position/s
ituation of women and girls”, e) “local integration activities”, f) “integration activities
for strengthening the common civil society” were formed. Their future proposals
should be used for the elaboration of the current integration politics7.
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4 Cf. www.bmi.bund.de, Date: 01.12.2006.
5 Cf. press releases by the “Coordination Committee of Muslims”, www.islam.de, Date 01.12.2007.
6 An additional meeting was organized by the Federal Home Office for 2007. But because of
some changes in the German foreigner law, DITIB, together with several other migrant
associations, boycotted the summit. (The changes in the law concerned the minimum age of 18
of Turkish women coming to Germany to get married.)
7 Cf. www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Artikel/2006/07/2006-07-14-pressekonferenz-
integrationsgipfel.html, Date: November 2006.
Islamic Community Milli GörüÒ (IGMG)
The “Islamic Community Milli GörüÒ is, next to the DITIB, the most
important Turkish-Sunni organization in Germany. However, in contrast to DITIB, this
religious organization stands out for its intensive political activities. Its central goal,
which is linked to Turkey, is the reorganization of the political order of this country on
the basis of the Islamic religion. To put it into other words, “Milli GörüÒ” strives for a
reconstruction of the social order in Turkey. The organizational and spiritual
connection between “Milli GörüÒ” in Germany and its original conservative Islamist
party (currently under the title of “Saadet Partisi”) in Turkey shows that the success of
this organization in Germany cannot solely be explained through endogenous (referring
to the immigration country) reasons. Instead, one has to assume that the change of the
former Milli Selamet Partisi” to a mass movement (“Refah Partisi Partisi”) in the
Turkey of the 90th had partly an influence on the success of “Milli GörüÒ” in Germany.
The “Islamic Community Milli GörüÒ” (IGMG) defines itself as an Islamic
religious community which extensively organises the religious life of Muslims. Apart
from fostering the doctrine, preaching of the Islamic religious denomination and
widespread fulfilment of the tasks defined by the denomination, the IGMG concerns
itself with all matters of Muslims and represents their interests. The IGMG makes an
effort to “improve the living conditions of Muslims and the protection of their
fundamental rights”8. 
The history of “Milli GörüÒ” in Germany started in 1985 when three
predecessor organizations combined themselves to an association named „Avrupa Milli
GörüÒ Teskilatlari“ (“Organization of the national view in Europe”). In 1995 the
umbrella organization was renamed “Islamic Community Milli GörüÒ” (IGMG)9. The
IGMG lists, according to its own account, includes altogether 2,060 associations
(mosque associations, youth —, women — and university associations etc.) in
Germany as well as in Europe, 16 679 member of board and 66 027 active community
members. IGMG emphasizes in its self-representation that it offers religious and social
service for 4 million Muslims in Europe. The range of services covers the erection of
prayer institutes, pilgrimages, up to a religious schooling of children and young people,
kindergartens etc. However, it would be wrong to regard “Milli GörüÒ” only as a
charitable organization with Muslim character, as the public representation of the
organization suggests10.
The most important political activities of “Milli GörüÒ” are mass gatherings11.
The first annual meeting took place in Frankfurt in 1995. This series of events was
continued in Antwerp (1996), Dortmund (1997) and Amsterdam (1998). The fifth and
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8 Cf. www.igmg.de, Date: March 2007.
9 The “Milli” (e.g. “national”) emphasises the genuine national orientation of the group. It is
supposed to signal the disassociation from both communistic and too liberal trends.
10 Cf. www.igmg.de, Date: March 2007.
11 Cf. Interview with two representatives of Milli GörüÒ, Mr M.G. and Mr B.A., Date: 15.01.07.
sixth annual meeting took place in Cologne in 1999 and 2000. In 2001 the annual
meeting was cancelled by the organizers as a clear symbol of sympathy with victims of
11th September. For the annual meeting 2002, the participants had to travel to Arnhem,
a Dutch town close to the German border. It is worth mentioning that the annual
meetings, usually taking place in football stadiums, were organized as both cultural
festivals and annual meetings at the same time. If one considers the course of the
events, the musical productions, the mood of the participants and the variety of
activities, one can, without a doubt, confirm the festive character of the mass
gatherings. Furthermore, the sub-groups, namely the women and youth’s groups,
celebrate their annual meetings as mass events. One should not forget a variety of
political demonstrations to mark current occasions, such as the closure of the preacher
schools in Turkey (1997). 
The change within the activities of “Milli GörüÒ” was initiated by 11th
September 2001. As mentioned above, after that date all activities in connection to
Islam were strongly linked, in the public and political discourse, to questions of risk.
While “Milli GörüÒ” showed their “religious-revolutionary” character before more or
less openly at mass demonstrations, after 9/11 they had to signal a stronger distancing
from bonds to the country of origin. The transnational activities, which IGMG before
conducted in two languages with totally different main emphases in a German and
Turkish national context, could not be maintained because of the increased attention of
surveillance organs to the revolutionary Islam12. The careful self-representation as a
religious community is a way out of this situation. The public pressure, which “Milli
GörüÒ” experiences because of its connection to Turkish Islamism, leads to a public
representation of its transnational references in terms of the globally operating Umma
ideology (Schiffauer, 2004). These changes in orientations of “Milli GörüÒ” can be also
understood with reference to the thesis of the deculturation of Islam (Roy, 2006). It
implies that the initially ethnic bound Islam detaches itself from its cultural roots and
strongly develops itself to a universal belief.
To sum up, “Milli GörüÒ” particularly emphasises its orientation towards the
immigration society. Neither the history of the group, which was born of Islamist
movements in Turkey, nor its Islamist symbols and goals, which are an obvious
contradiction to public integration requests, are discussed today. Similar to DITIB,
“Milli GörüÒ” is forced to publicly distance itself from acts of violence which are
committed in the name of Islam. Thus, nowadays “Milli GörüÒ” focuses on activities
which are connected to the integration question. On the one hand, the association
strives for a legal recognition as a religious community and, on the other hand, it fights
for the recognition of Islamic religious education as a school subject. The organization
cooperates with other Islamic organizations in Germany, such as DITIB, considering
these questions. This cooperation mainly takes place within the scope of the Islamic
conference (2006, 2007), organized by the federal Home Office. It needs to be
mentioned that IGMG is the part of the association “Islamic Council”, which
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12 Today one can observe on “Milli GörüÒ” webpage that the Turkish and German version is
identical, which was not the case before 9/11.
participates actively in the Islamic Conference. Thus, one can undoubtedly describe the
politics of Milli GörüÒ in Germany as a “struggle for recognition”13 (Taylor, 1992;
Schiffauer, 2004), which implies a far-reaching transformation of the political
representation strategies of migrant’s religious organizations.
Alevitic Community Germany (Almanya Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu/
AABF)
The association AABF with its headquarter in Cologne was founded by seven
Alevitic associations in 1991 and it is the central community of the “Federation of
Alevitic Communities of Europe” (Avrupa Alevi Birlikleri Konfederasyonu/AABK).
The fact that ‘Muslim’ migrants of Sunnite background are mainly the focus of the
medial discourse makes it more important to pay attention to an Alevitic organization
in which not only Turkish but also Kurdish migrants are organized. 
Alevism refers to, from a Sunni perspective, a heterodox religious persuasion
within Islam, which is mainly spread among Anatolian Turks. Even though Alevism
was created as a kind of Shia, it maintained the pre-Islamic cultural elements and
newly articulated them in an Islamic form. Without going into detail of the history of
Alevism, it has to be mentioned that the institutionalisation of Alevitic organizations in
Turkey has only been possible since the mid-1980s. The first public appearance of
Alevitic intellectuals in Turkey took place in 1990, when a group of Alevitic
intellectuals published an “Alevitic Declaration” (Öz, 1996).
The first “Federation of Alevitic Communities in Germany” (“Almanya Alevi
Cemaatlari Federasyonu“) was already founded in Germany in January 1991. It was
renamed “Alevitic Community of Germany” in 1992. It is worth mentioning that the
Alevitic movement could count on the support of the European public because of its
lasting disadvantages in Turkey. At the same time, the specific type of believe can
explain the missing mistrust of Alevites in Europe: The Alevitic religiousness distances
itself from some of the basic elements of majority Sunni Islam, such as the division of
gender, veiling, five-times prayer in the mosque or the prohibition of alcohol, etc.
Therefore, the Alevitic way of living does not give grounds for everyday life relevant,
symbolically charged conflicts. The political preferences of Alevites, though, can be
located in the left or rather social-democratic, laical camp.
The Alevitic Community of Germany, whose main goal is the “protection and
development of cultural independence, religious and philosophical values of Alevites
living in Europe”, actively operated religiously and politically in a German as well as a
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13 Both terms ‘struggle for recognition’ and ‘identity politics’ go back to the political
philosophy of Charles Taylor (1992). They refer to the political engagement of minorities
within the nation states, which, on the one hand, try to obtain the same political and legal
equality as the majority of the population and, on the other hand, strive for the preservation
of their own specific cultural identity.   
Turkish national context14. The transnational orientation of the community can be seen
in the constitution of the association: The catalogue of demands of the Alevitic
Community of Germany to the Turkish government comprises: 1) “constitutional
recognition of Alevism”, 2) “abolition of the Department of Religious Interests Diyanet
in Turkey, this is the only possible way to realize the laical form of government”,
3) “claims against the state to enable a free formation of religious institutes”,
4) “request of a legal regulation of journalistic reporting on Alevism”15. 
The expectations to the national authorities of Germany as well as other
European countries include a catalogue of demands, which can be grasped with the
famous term “identity politics”. To this belong demands 1) for legal recognition of
Alevitic organizations as a denomination, 2) for a consideration of Alevism in the
school subject “religion and ethics”: Alevism should not only be taught to migrant
children but to all of them, 3) for an integration of scientific research on Alevism at
German (and European) universities in disciplines, such as Turkish studies, Islam and
the history of the Middle East, 4) support for practices of religious duties by local
authorities – for example, by the establishment of praying houses (so-called Cem-
Houses) in boroughs, and finally, 5) institutionalization of the migrant children’s rights
to learn their mother tongue16.  
The specific activities of AABF unfold within the bounds of demands. The
content analysis of the topics of the association’s magazine “Alevilerin Sesi” suggests
that the majority of the topics refer to Turkey. The association cooperates with other
Alevitic organizations in Turkey, especially concerning the central question of an
institutionalisation of the Alevitic belief in Turkey. At the moment AABF is intensively
involved in the debate on Diyanet’s existence in Turkey because, despite of neutral
legal regulation, this influential religion department prefers Sunni Islam (Tezcan,
2003). Thus, AABF protested against the plans of the Turkish government to send
Alevitic clergymen (Dedes) to Europe with the help of Diyanet17.
The AABF activities referring to Germany concentrate on the debates about
obligatory religious education at state-owned schools. Even though Alevites in Turkey
and Europe work closely together, there are some disagreements in problem depictions.
While Alevites in Turkey want a general abolition of religious education, AABF rather
prefers the German model of religious freedom: religious communities determine the
content of religious education themselves18.
Partly, the German authorities benevolently correspond to the demand of the
association. The Alevitic religious education was accepted in Berlin for the first time in
2002. Furthermore, there are plans for an Alevitic religious education in at least three
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16 Cf. ibid.
17 Cf. “Almanya’ya Dede Yollayan Diyanet”, Radikal, Date: 05.02.2007.
18 Cf. Interview with a representative of AABF, Mr I.K., Date: 04.12.2006.
towns in Baden-Wurttemberg in 2006/07. In North Rhine-Westphalia, Bavaria and
Hesse Alevitic education can be offered at a minimum of 12 participants19. Thus, the
recognition of AABF as a religious community as well as its acceptance as a public
cooperation is the centre of attention for the association’s work. Especially the
religious education plays an important role because in Germany, in contrast to Turkey,
it can be planned by religious communities themselves. This fact gives additional
expression to the institutional legitimacy of the religious community in question. This
goal – the recognition of the Alevitic Community of Germany as a public cooperation –
was explicitly added to the constitution of the AABF.
To sum up, the political strategies of AABF – in Germany as well as Turkey –
can be described as public discussion performances: Apart from the publication of
press statements and occasional organization of political demonstrations (e.g. co-
organization of the protest activities against the presidential candidature of Tayyip
Erdofian in Ankara in April 2007), the AABF took part in the German Islamic
Conference 2006 and 2007. The targets of political activities on the Turkish part are, on
the one hand, the Turkish government authorities and, on the other hand, the left-wing
democratic opposition in which the Alevites play an important role. The situation in
Germany is different. The ABBF communicated with both, Churches and authorities.
In the whole, the Alevitic Community in Germany operates openly in transnational
spaces: because of the discriminated position of the Alevitic movement in Turkey, the
usual integration requests of German politicians, directed to the Sunni associations, do
not arise. 
POLITICAL TOPICS, STRATEGIES AND ADDRESSEES OF
TURKISH POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS
Federation of Democratic Workers’ Associations (Demokratik IÒçi
Dernekleri Federasyonu / DIDF)
The “Federation of Democratic Workers’ Associations” leans to the formerly
dominant political paradigm of class conflict. This association, dating back to the
Maoist movement in Turkey, remains loyal to the idea of “international solidarity of the
working population in the anti-imperialistic battle against international assets”20. The
association was founded by the union of several Turkish origin workers’ associations,
in Bielefeld in 1980. At the moment there are 33 local member associations with 2,000
members throughout Germany. The association publishes a German magazine called
“Young voice” and supports the Turkish magazine “Evrensel” (i.e. “The Universalist”). 
DIDF’s activities are partly directed towards Turkey. Thus, the association
maintains cooperation with human rights organizations and trade unions in Turkey. It
supports the battle against torture and the death penalty. These activities are expressed
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20 Cf. www.didf.de, Date: March 2007.
in different ways: On the one hand, the association published statements; on the other,
the association invites Turkish guests to its celebrations21. However, DIDF concen-
trates a majority of its activities on Germany. In the centre of attention are those
activities which are connected to the integration debate. Although DIDF was not
invited to take part in the Integration Summit (2006, 2007), the association publicly
voiced and addressed its statements to the participants of the Summit. The proposals in
connection to the integration question are mainly directed towards state authorities.
They include 1) the proposal of support of language courses for immigrants,
2) criticism of the public stigmatisation of migrants by constantly taking up topics such
as “forced marriage” and “honour killings”, 3) request of the introduction of the
Turkish mother tongue at schools, e.g. in form of a foreign language subject, 4) finally,
the request to replace religious education lesson with “history of religions lessons”22.
The increasing public debate about religious questions in connection to integration
problems, which started approximately 2001, is also observed by DIDF. However, it is
interpreted, in a Marxist sense, as a diversion from the real problem of people23. 
The less DIDF takes part in religion-political debates, the more it concentrates
on the political discussion of political questions, such as unemployment, a low level of
education of immigrants, health questions and questions of social protection.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the association cooperates with the left-wing parties
in Germany concerning these topics. Thus, DIDF directly cooperates with WASG
(“Election Alternative”) and with “Die Linke/PDS” as well as labour unions. The
association publicly supported the left-wing party “Die Linke/PDS” at the last elections
of parliament in September 2006. In addition it regularly joins the demonstrations of
the German Association of Unions. Apart from these demonstrations and traditional
Mai-rallies, the DIDF also organizes protest events: for example the signature
collection “Say ‘no’ to loyalty testing! Say ‘yes’ to naturalization” (2006), was joined
by famous politicians such as Oskar Lafontaine and Lothar Bisky.
To sum up, the internationalist orientation of DIFD does not lead to tensions
between the transnational bonds of the association and public integration requests. The
articulation of national and cultural interests is not important for DIDF because the
integration-relevant questions are regarded through the prism of universal class
identity. For this reason, the public debate is not denounced as an integration
hindrance.
Turkish Community in Germany (Almanya Türk Toplumu / TGD)
The “Turkish Community in Germany” was founded by the union of different
umbrella organizations in Hamburg in 1995. The main emphasis of the association is to
represent the interests, requests and demands of Turkish-origin migrants to German
national institutions and in public.
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23 Cf. interview with the DIDF representative Mr B. P., Date: 29.11.2006.
TGD explicitly stresses its reference to Turkey in its self-description. Thus, the
first sentence of the association’s constitution starts with the following words: “We,
citizens of a Turkish origin, have permanently settles in the Federal Republic of
Germany”24. In doing so they underline that they strive for more protection and support
by the state “as a cultural minority”. TGD declares its goal a “better communication
between the German and Turkish nation by supporting a cultural exchange, youth
welfare as well as education and occupational training”25. At the same time, they
underline the consideration of Turkish political questions as an important task of the
association. Furthermore, the TGB claims to be “independent of political and religious
ideologies and autonomous from associations with conservative, liberal, social-
democratic or religious orientations”26. 
GD’s political activities are diverse. The association issues publicly effective
statements, press releases and PR campaigns, and organizes public conferences and
events. One of the current tasks addressed by TGD is the replacement of the current
German “policy on foreigners” with a “policy of equality”. This aim is presented in a
policy paper for Integration Summit in 200627: 
“Law equality, the same possibilities of taking part in political and social
decision processes, as well as in the education system and world of work [should]
be called basic preconditions… [for] integration”28. 
These requests for recognition, which are addressed to both the German
government authorities and the public, are accompanied by demands for dual
citizenship of migrants29. Another important role is also assigned to the local right to
vote. At the same time an intercultural reorganization of the civil service, the
introduction of a quota (approx. 10% of all employment) according to the new
multiculturalism debate are demanded. Finally, the achievement of the so-called
intercultural opening of the education system: “this means to revise the framework plan
– this has to be applied to all subjects – in such a way that the prevailing culture of
origin, language and religion can find some room in it”. Thus, according to the new
support of bilingual education, German-Turkish Europe-Schools, similar to the ones
already existing in Berlin, should be established in other federal states. The range of
demands goes as far as naming streets after celebrities from the migration country and
the establishment of programs in the Turkish language30.
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24 Cf. Constitution, in: www.tgd.de, Date: March 2006.
25 Cf. ibid.
26 Cf. ibid.
27 The Integration Summit was organized by the Federal Home Office 2006 and 2007. But TGD
only participated in the first meeting 2006. After changes in the Foreigners Law 2007 TDU
avoided the Summit and thus protested against it.
28 Cf. Position paper of TGD “Equality and participation politics instead of a policy on
foreigners” 2006, p. 3.
29 Despite of few exceptions German law aims to avoid dual citizenship. After the law reform in
2000 the migrants` children can keep the dual citizenship until the age of 18, then they have
to decide between the German and the foreign citizenship.
30 Cf. Position paper of TGD “Equality and participation politics instead of a policy on
foreigners” 2006: 9-28.
Apart from these requests, TGD formulated a demands referring to religious
questions which were presented at the Islamic Conference (2006). The association
emphasised its laical? orientation and correspondingly demanded a school subject with
the title “Islamic studies and ethics”31. These demands are pursued in cooperation with
other Turkish origin associations such as DITIB and are directed towards German
government authorities, the German public and, at the same time (especially
concerning Turkey’s EU accession) towards the Turkish public32.
To sum up, the political recognition of Turkish identity aimed at by TGD does
not lead to political tension between transnational bonds and integration requests
coming from TGD’s environment. This perception cannot only be found within the
organization but also within the federal German integration debate. On the one hand,
this unproblematic compatibility of transnational references and integration political
requests has to do with the fact that representatives of TGD are members of federal
German parties (such as the SPD MPs Vural Öfier and Hakkı Keskin). On the other
hand, it is connected to the association’s impeccable laicist orientation and the resulting
positive connotation of its integration politics. Finally, the Kemalistic character of the
TGD saves the association from a negative positioning within the integration debate.
The association avoids the discussion of life-practical cultural obstacles of everyday
life, such as the question of headscarves or the participation of migrant children in
swimming lessons, and relinquishes the Turkish-nationalistic attitude which propagates
an insuperable distance between a western and non-western cultural environment. 
POLITICAL TOPICS, STRATEGIES AND ADDRESSEES OF
TURKISH BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 
Association of Turkish Entrepreneurs and Industrialists in Europe e.V.
(Avrupa Türk IÒadamlari ve Sanayicileri Dernefii / ATIAD)
The organization goals of ATIAD33 show transnational references: first of all,
the association is supposed to function as a “bridge” or rather a “link” between
Germany, the European Union and Turkey. This “bridging function” should particularly
be expressed in economical dimensions by “reinforcing the economic relations (trade
relations) between Turkey and Germany, as well as Turkey and other EU- and EFTA-
countries”34. The second objective of the association is the Turkey’s involvement in
national markets and in the global economy. The aim is to inform members about
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33 The association (founded in 1992) represents medium-sized and large Turkish-origin
enterprises and characterises itself as a “pioneer and advocate of Turkish entrepreneurship in
Europe”. The headquarter of the association, which consists 40 members, is in Düsseldorf,
however the main work takes place in Ankara, Istanbul, Brussels, Luxembourg and Berlin.
34 Cf. constitution of ATIAD e.V., in: www.atiad.org, Date: November 2005.
economic profit opportunities as well as legal prevailing conditions of potential
markets. The third objective of ATIAD is the articulation of “line of business specific
questions” to governments in Turkey, Germany and other European countries as well as
the European Union. Furthermore, the interests of Turkish and Turkish origin
entrepreneurs should be represented to the line of business and profession associations.
Finally Turkey’s full membership in the European Union should be achieved.
It is also possible to divide ATIAD’s activities into economical and political
types35. ATIAD’s political practices refer to both the discussion of relevant political
questions and the development of strategies for solving them. These questions can be
divided according to their content: 1) support of training/apprenticeship and 2) Turkey’s
accession o the EU.
(Ad 1) ATIAD developed three solutions for the “deficits” which exist in the
field of apprenticeship of young people of Turkish origin. According to its own data,
the members of the association provide a large amount of apprenticeship places for
Turkish-origin or foreign young people. Furthermore, additional projects are initiated
which support the creation of apprenticeship places for young people of Turkish origin.
Thus, in 2003 an evaluation project in cooperation with the IHK and the job centre was
conducted in Düsseldorf, in which potential non-German apprenticeship companies
were determined. In addition, ATIAD regularly offers an apprenticeship price which is
awarded to excellent young professionals of Turkish origin. Every two years prices are
awarded in such areas as “craftman’s certificate, apprenticeship, abitur36, degree and
PhD (…) to make the wide public aware of the brisance of the topic”37. The topic of
apprenticeship was also intensively discussed with important German politicians (such
as the then Chancellor Gerhard Schröder or the then North Rhine-Westphalian
Minister-President Wolfgang Clement). Several times over the past years, the
chairperson of ATIAD presented the situation of Turkish-origin enterprises as well as
the apprenticeship problems of young people of Turkish origin at the national press
conference Berlin.
(Ad 2) The question of an “accession of Turkey to the EU” is addressed to the
state authorities in different forms: by establishing contacts with German, Turkish and
EU politicians, by formulating “position papers” in which the attitude of ATIAD are
formulated, and by written contacts with Turkish, German and European politicians.
Hence, ATIAD’s representatives personally visited both the German Chancellor
(August 2005, November 2003) and the Bavarian Home Secretary Günter Beckstein
(June 2004). Furthermore, an ATIAD delegation met the President of the European
Parliament, Pat Cox (December 2003), in Brussels. In November 2003 the Turkish
Prime Minister Tayyip Erdofian welcomed ATIAD representatives. At these personal
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36 “Abitur” is a school examination usually taken at the end of the 13th year and approximately
equivalent to the British A level.
37 Cf. ATIAD e.V. brochure 2005.
meetings with representatives of German, Turkish and European politics, which have
been extensively built up since 2000, ATIAD’s recommendations (in form of position
papers) have been passed on in an oral or written form38. 
For instance, the ATIAD directed its written question to German politicians,
such as Edmund Stoiber (2003) and Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, as well as the
Turkish the Foreign Minister Ismail Cem (2001). Moreover, ATIAD sent its
recommendations to England’s Prime Minister Tony Blair (2002) and to the President
of the European Parliament Pat Cox (2002)39.
To sum up, the term “integration” is used by ATIAD with dual connotation. On
the one hand, integration is linked to the individual levels of the individual migrants.
Thus, ATIAD understands itself as a supporter of integration processes. The second
meaning hints directly at the Turkey’s political integration process in the EU. In this
context the transnational orientations of the association function as an important
resource for political negotiations.
Müsiad Berlin e.V (Müstakil Sanayici ve IÒadamları Dernefii)
Which political strategies does Müsiad Berlin40 develop in view of the
integration demands from the outside? First of all, it is important to note that the
association cultivates explicit transnational references. The name of the organization,
as well as its constitution, hints at the symbolic connection between Müsiad Berlin e.V.
and MÜSIAD Turkey. An example for this is the mentioning of the most important
principle of Muslim entrepreneurship in the representation of organizational goals:
1. “We believe that the interest system cannot be a long-term working-method
of economy”.
2. “Enterprises, which can be accessed by the nation, whose capital is
distributed and free of speculative influence, make the healthiest development of
the country and of the national economy possible.”41
These moral concepts are important as a regulative for the entrepreneurial
practice of the members of the associations. The essential organizational goals for
Müsiad Berlin are, firstly, a promotion of “entrepreneurial activities of the members”
and, secondly, negotiation activities between (smaller) Turkish businesses and German
economic and political institutions42.
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38 Cf. “Position paper” by ATIAD addressed to German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, Date:
August 2005.
39 Cf. Interview with the representative of ATIAD, Mr Esref Ünsal, Date: 2.11.2005.
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was founded by companies of Turkish origin in Berlin in 1994. In 1996 the Müsiad
associations came down to a total of more than 700 members in Germany.
41 Cf. www.muesiad-berlin.de, Date: 23.09.2005, cf. Visions and Goals.
42 Cf. constitution of Müsiad Berlin e.V., see also an interview with Mr Âevki Karasu, Date:
26.09.2005.
The main part of the activities of the association can be described as economic
socialisation performances43. A rather small part of the association’s work is influenced
by politically relevant aspects mainly concerning topics such as the “integration of
minorities of Turkish origin in Germany” and political “integration of Turkey in the
EU”. First of all, the association offers its members a discussion forum for these topics,
by offering workshops and seminars which favour a political formation of opinion, for
example “Conference: EU and Turkey” (2003), seminar “Enlargement of EU to the
East” (2004), seminar “Turks and Islam” (2005), seminar “Relationship EU – Turkey”
(2005). Secondly, the association addresses its ideas, expectations and interests to
German politicians as well as Turkish. Therefore, between 2003 and 2005 the
association welcomed Turkish representatives of politics, such as the Tourism Minister
Güldal AkÒit (2003), the Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdofian (2005), Turkish
Members of Parliament and the vice chairpersons of the Turkish governing party AKP,
Âaban DiÒli und Reha Denemeç (2003), the Turkish Ambassador Ali Irtemcelik (2004)
and the Turkish President of Parliament Bülent Arınç (2004). The main thematic
emphasis of these meetings refers to the relationship between Turkey and Germany but
also to the relationship between Turkey and EU: For example, Prime Minister Erdofian,
who was the guest of honour at the 10-years celebration of Müsiad Berlin, emphasised
that the “integration of Turkish-origin enterprises in Germany” can be seen as an
“important contribution to the efforts for Turkey’s accession to the EU”. Also the
members of the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) discussed relevant political questions
such as the “accession of Turkey to the EU”, “the Immigrants Act” and “the political
development in Turkey”. At the meeting with the Turkish Ambassador politically
important topics such as the “situation of Turkish migrants” as well as the “current
political developments in Germany” were discussed. Müsiad Berlin proposed to
conduct regular discussions to the attaché for work, education and economy, in order to
work out common strategies to solve the problems of the Turkish and Turkish-origin
population in Germany.”44
The representatives of the Müsiad associations in Germany, one of them
Müsiad Berlin e.V., also cultivate contacts to Turkish politicians directly in Turkey. In
March/April 2003, a meeting between German Müsiad representatives and Turkish
politicians, such as the Prime Minister and the chairperson of the governing party AKP
(Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi), Tayyip Erdofian, the chairperson of the opposition party
CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi), Deniz Baykal, the Ministry of Industry and Economy,
Ali CoÒkun, as well as the vice chairman of the AKP, Eyüp Fatsa, took place. In the
meetings they discussed “the situation of Turks living in Europe”. It is interesting to
note that afterwards a new committee of the Turkish parliament was founded in order
to deal with this question45. Furthermore, Müsiad Berlin e.V. addressed political
expectations to German politicians. The association cultivates contacts to representa-
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the members but political topics are also discussed. 
44 Cf. www.muesiad-berlin.de, Date: 03.01.2006.
45 Cf. ibid.
tives of the federal German parties. In January 2003, a delegation of the association
visited the Berlin parliament, after receiving an invitation from the Turkish origin
Member of Parliament Özcan Mutlu (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen). At this meeting
“problems of the Turkish entrepreneurs in Berlin and Germany” were discussed, too46.
Furthermore, the association is in contact with politicians of the CDU/CSU. In April
2004 it participated in a CDU forum on the “EU-membership of Turkey”. In March
2005 Müsiad Berlin e.V. invited the CDU chairperson at the Berlin parliament to a
“political breakfast”. At the latter they not only addressed the “situation of Turkish
entrepreneurs in Germany” but also such topics as “the Immigrant Act in Germany”. 
To sum up, when meeting with political decision makers, Müsiad Berlin e.V.
discusses mainly political (and not economical) questions. In the introspective of the
organizations the transnational reference is not perceived as an integration hindrance.
At the same time the term “integration” has a dual meaning for the association: On the
one hand, it is used in correspondence with the integration of immigrants of Turkish
origin in Germany. According to the association, entrepreneurs of Turkish origin can
directly support this. On the other hand, “integration” is regarded as the political
integration of Turkey in the EU. 
German-Turkish Chamber of Industry and Commerce (Türk-
Alman Ticaret ve Sanayi Odasi / TD-IHK)
This organization, with its headquarters in Cologne, is a counterpart of the
Turkey-based German-Turkish Chamber of Industry and Commerce, existing since
1994. While the latter represents the interest of German enterprises in Turkey, the TD-
IHK represents the interests of Turkish enterprises in Germany. At the same time the
association regards itself as an “advocate for enterprises of Turkish origin in
Germany”. A positive image of the association was created by the honour memberships
of the former German Chancellor Schröder and the Turkish Prime Minister Erdofian.
The essential goals of the TD-IHK are: a) support of the economic relationship
between Germany and Turkey; b) “contacts to the German and Turkish government,
public corporations”; 3) accomplishment of activities which support Turkey’s
accession to the EU, as well as d) support of “training of bilingual qualified employees
and executives”47. These issues structure the economic and political practices of the
TD-IHK, which offers two to five events per month.
The public discussion of politically relevant questions as well as apprentice-
ship support of Turkish-origin young people can be regarded as the main political
practices of the TD-IHK. Also the accession of Turkey to the EU is discussed from a
political point of view at different events48.
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In the field of apprenticeship places the association tries to create additional
apprenticeship places by giving advices to enterprises of Turkish origin based in
Germany. According to the association the man-power of young people with an
immigrant background should not be underestimated. Instead they should be given a
chance to develop themselves into “qualified, bilingual and bicultural qualified
workers and executives”49. The association, in connection with the Education Ministry,
advises German, Turkish and Turkish origin enterprises in Germany on creating
apprenticeship places. In addition the representatives of the TD-IHK also discussed
further proposals related to this question of apprenticeship on the 2006/07 Integration
Summit. It is noteworthy that, also in the case of TD-IHK, the transnational orientation
of the chamber conditions the specific comprehension of the integration debate.
Turkish-German business association Berlin-Brandenburg (Türk-
Alman Berlifii Bellin-Brandenburg / TDU)
The political strategies of Müsiad Berlin mainly consist of the organization
and institutionalization of the reliable circle of addressees of political partners.
Comparable forms of communication can also be observed with the TDU50. This
association can also be characterized through visible transnational references. 
Apart from economical practices51, the association is dedicated to the
discussion of political problems. These discussion processes can be divided according
to their content into the following areas: 1) apprenticeship problems, 2) representation
of entrepreneurship of Turkish origin towards political and economical institutions,
3) Turkey’s accession to the EU and 4) request for an introduction of dual citizenship52.
(Ad 1) Apprenticeship procedures and chances of young people of Turkish
origin are discussed; furthermore, solutions for these problems are worked out and
presented. Thus, “problems at school, as well as on the job and apprenticeship market”
are characterized as alarming. In connection with this, the TDU initiated “sensitization
work” with state facilities. According to TDU proposals small businesses which create
additional apprenticeships should be financially supported. In addition, there should
also be apprenticeship places for young people with a migration background in stated-
owned organizations. The support of business start-up by “giving advice and providing
uncomplicated small loans” would also help to improve the apprenticeship situation. It
is characteristic for TDU to get in touch with influential institutions in Germany and
Turkey to work on this problem. In June 2003, for example, the TDU, together with the
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Similar to Müsiad Berlin e.V., the TDU represents small and medium-sized enterprises in
Berlin and surroundings.
51 The business socialisation of enterprises with a migrational background is made possible in
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52 Cf. www.tdu-berlin.de, Date: January 2005.
IHK (Chamber of Industry and Commerce), HWK (Chamber of Trade), Berlin Senate
for Economy, as well as the consulate general of Turkey, took part in the job centre
initiative “Turkish enterprises for more apprenticeship places”53.
(Ad 2) The TDU regards itself as the junction between economical and
political institutions in Germany as well as migrants of Turkish origin in Berlin-
Brandenburg. It is obvious that the association is also regarded as such as junction by
economical and political institutions in Germany. This can be detected, for example, in
the fact that both politically and economically important people attended TDU’s last
general meeting in Mai 2005: Berlin’s mayor, the Turkish consul general, the
presidents of the IHK and HWK. The TDU is regarded as an expert organization for
economy of Turkish origin and involved in decision making processes of state
committees in Berlin54. Furthermore, today – in contrast to its start-up period – they
successfully cooperate with chambers of trade (IHK and HWK). Additionally the TDU
is in contact with other organizations which represent the interests of migrant with a
Turkish origin. They especially cooperate with the Turkish German Community (TGD)
in questions concerning the “social-political integration” of immigrants of Turkish
origin. The TDU also represents Turkish-origin enterprises at numerous seminars and
conferences55. Worth mentioning is that the TDU represents the interest of Berlin
enterprises not only to the German authority but also to the authority of Turkish
politics. Thus, they negotiated export/import questions with the Turkish Foreign Trade
Ministry.
(Ad 3) However, the TDU does not only mentally support Turkey’s accession
to the EU: in June 2004 before the elections for the European Parliament, the
association appealed to its members to vote only for parties that support Turkey’s EU-
membership. The question of Turkey’s membership is discussed with both, Turkish
politicians (e.g. during the visit of a Turkish AKP delegation in June 2004) and German
politicians (representatives of FDP, SPD. CDU, die Grünen and Linke/PDS). Thus,
they disapprove of the anti-Turkish politics of the CDU, such as the circular by Angela
Merkel to the heads of government and commission members of the EU, in which she
argued against Turkey’s accession to the EU.
(Ad 4) Furthermore, the TDU wants to achieve a lifelong dual citizenship for
migrants` offspring. They hope to accelerate the political decision processes by
publicly expounding the problems of citizenship regulations. 
In sum, the association regards its transnational bonds as politically relevant
but not necessarily helpful for integration in a classic sense. Although it argues that the
chances for an apprenticeship for young people of Turkish origin in Germany should be
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improved, the association insists on changing the basic political conditions of Turkish
origin minorities through mechanisms such as tolerance of dual citizenship. Conse-
quently, from the perspective of the association, the integration of the Turkish-origin
minority in Germany can only be accomplished by political recognition of its
transnational linkages. 
CONCLUSION
The shift of our empirical research to an organizational level of migrant
activities points out the necessity to rethink the role of migrant associations in the
receiving countries. In addition, we have to discuss tree points from transnational
perspective: firstly, the sociological understanding of the term ‘integration’ and,
secondly, the positioning of migrant organizations within the so-called integration
processes.
At the beginning of this article ‘integration’ is defined as a two-way-process
which, on the one hand, is expressed in the interaction between national authorities and
individuals and, on the other, in the interaction between national authorities and
migrant associations. The article refers to the latter and emphasizes that especially
discussion performances of migrant associations can be regarded as central political
activities in this connection. This result hints at the discursive dimension of interaction
processes between the nation state and migrant associations. From this perspective
‘integration’ can be regarded as a public ‘definition struggle’ or as a public negotiation
of cultural and identity boundary drawing processes.
This public negotiation of boundaries between majorities and minorities can
be found in two forms, media discussions and symbolically charged political events
– such as the Islamic Conference (2006, 2007) and the Integration Summit (2006,
2007) in which most of the associations took part in. As one can see, associations play
a central role in the construction of the national integration discourse. At the same time
their public reference to the topic ‘integration’ is a specific form of identity work, e.g. a
specific form of self-description of associations (Rauer, 2008: 190). In this context,
transnational linkages obtain a specific symbolic meaning within the integration
discourse. The appearance of transnational references in the discursive field is also
regulated by the distribution of spokesperson positions, the connections of utterances,
as well as the reference to related or adjoined discourses. 
As we have seen the spokesperson position of migrant associations is
restricted by nation state authorities. It is visible especially in cases of the above
mentioned conferences such as the Islamic conference and the Integration Summit
which are organized by the Federal Home Office. Apart from this aspect, the public
presentations of associations’ transnational linkages are organized by the semantic
scheme of ‘support or non-support of integration’. This rule of statements production
constructs a semantic boundary between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’. But the term ‘integration’
refers to the process-related dimension of societal life, this is why the construction of
boundaries in this case can be better grasped by the scheme of “Joining Us” or
“Staying Other”. Therefore, transnational linkages can always be mentioned whenever
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it is necessary to present them as resources for integration. In other words, trans-
national linkages are re-interpreted in the context of the integration debate. Additionally,
we have pointed out that although all analyzed associations actively take part in the
public integration discussions, their public strategies concerning transnationality differ
significantly. The religious associations analyzed above try to present their trans-
national bonds as no hindrance for integration. Moreover, particularly such associa-
tions as DITIB and IGMG prefer to avoid the discussion of their transnational activities
especially since 9/11. In opposition, the business and political associations discussed
above stress their belonging to the plural national context. They regard their trans-
national bonds as knowledge competences which are useful and even necessary for
bringing integration processes ahead. This difference of statement construction is
caused by a partial link of transnational references and religious debates, in other
words by inter-discursive connections.
Two points have to be distinguished in this case. Firstly, in the German context
the public mistrust regarding religious organizations of migrants’ refers to the
suspiciousness of their view on the relationship between politics and religion. The
dominant public assumption is that religious associations organize their political
activities on the basis of religious principles. This suspicion is especially high in regard
to the Sunni Muslim associations DITIB and IGMG, although one has to mention that
the latter actually practices in such a way. However, the idea that boundary between
politics and religion can vanish, puts the central premise of western nations states into
question. Concomitantly, the reference to transnational linkages in the cases of DITIB
and IGMG would increase such suspicions and cause their labelling as not willing to
integrate. In the public debate they would be defined as ‘Staying Them’ and not as
‘Joining Us’. Secondly, some current trends in the global societal frame condition the
connection between transnationality, religious discourse and global risk perception.
Especially after 9/11 the perspective of western states on religious matters has been
transformed, whereas religious questions become the priority of the political agenda
(Eisenstadt, 2007). This global trend constrains also the activities of Turkish religious
associations in Germany.
In opposite to Sunni religious associations, political and business associations
of migrants promote principles and statements which are highly accepted on the
political agenda, because they are based on the re-formulated idea of equality. This idea
expresses itself in the so-called ‘identity politics’, which aim, on the one hand, to
achieve equal political rights and, on the other, to recognize the cultural difference of
minorities (Taylor, 1992). The connection between ‘identity politics’ and transnational
references is accepted in German public debates. Transnational linkages are re-defined
by business and political associations as a cultural basis which enables the represen-
tation of migrants’ cultural otherness. Because they aim at an acceptation of their
cultural specificity, they remove transnational linkages from a private to a public
sphere. From their point of view, only the recognition of their cultural otherness by
state authorities and the German public allows a successful integration. In other words,
they stress the possibility of simultaneous belonging to both positions: ‘Staying Other’
and ‘Joining the Majority’. Their public self-description follows, therefore, the
semantical rule of inclusion of different social items, the so-called ‘both/and’-logic of
transnationality. 
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To sum up, the survey of political activities of Turkish migrant associations in
Germany has shown that the associations have taken over a specific spokesperson
position within the German integration discourse. Nevertheless, they can only partially
influence the rules of discursive statement production due to a restricted access to
societal definition processes. However, they are capable of shifting the semantic
boundaries of ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ in the national integration discourse through commu-
nicative references to transnational linkages. From the transnational perspective, this
accomplishment can be regarded as a contribution to the accommodation which is
understood as a negotiation of mutual cooperation of majorities and minorities. 
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Les associations turques de migrants en Allemagne : entre pression à
l’intégration et liens transnationaux
Anna AMELINA et Thomas FAIST
Contrairement à l’affirmation selon laquelle les activités transnationales des organisa-
tions migrantes sont surtout déterminées par les cadres institutionnels, cet article part du principe
que les pratiques des organisations transnationales des migrants sont aussi marquées par la façon
dont ces organisations articulent leur orientation transnationale avec l’impératif de l’intégration.
Par conséquent cet article poursuit la question de savoir comment des organisations migrantes
orientées de façon transnationale gèrent la pression à l’intégration.
Cette problématique a été développée à partir des associations et organisations reli-
gieuses, politiques et économiques turques en Allemagne. L’hypothèse est que l’intégration est
un champ discursif et complexe, dans lequel les associations migrantes représentent un porte-
parole spécifique. Malgré le fait que toutes les associations examinées ont participé aux débats
sur l’intégration, il a été constaté qu’elles gèrent de manière très différente cette pression à l’inté-
gration. Les associations religieuses, notamment sunnites, ont des difficultés avec la représen-
tation publique de leur attachement transnational, en raison du terrorisme. Par contre, les
associations politiques et économiques peuvent communiquer publiquement leur orientation
transnationale et la mettre en avant. En même temps, ces associations relient leurs exigences
d’égalité des droits des migrants à leurs liens transnationaux. Ainsi, bien que les associations
migrantes turques aient un accès restreint aux processus de définitions sociales, les associations
politiques et économiques en particulier, réussissent à interpréter l’impératif de l’intégration de
façon nouvelle. Par conséquent elles se positionnent dans la discussion de l’intégration en tant
qu’acteurs et elles occupent une double position sociale, en représentant dans la société
d’immigration allemande l’« altérité » et en même temps les « non- étrangers ».
Turkish Migrant Associations in Germany: Between Integration
Pressure and Transnational Linkages
Anna AMELINA and Thomas FAIST
In contrast to the thesis that transnational political activities of migrant communities
and organizations are mainly influenced by the institutional pressure of nation states, the article
argues that transnational politics of migrants are also determined by specific ways migrant
associations connect their homeland orientation with public integration requests. Therefore, the
paper focuses on the question how migrant associations, which cultivate transnational linkages,
deal with state integration pressure. This conceptual statement was tested in the case study
focused on political activities of selected religious, political and business associations of Turkish
migrants settled in Germany. The presented research results are based on the relational
perspective on integration processes and define integration as a discursive field in which migrant
associations obtain a specific spokesperson position. One of the central research observations is
that although all analyzed associations take part in integration debates, their ways of dealing with
integration pressure differ decisively. The Sunni religious associations, for instance, cannot
publicly present their transnational bonds because of the globally assumed danger of trans-
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national Islamic organizations. In contrast to them, political and business organizations can voice
their transnational connections publicly and present them in a positive way, because the core
activities of these associations are related to the identity politics. These aims are positively
coloured by most political actors in Germany. They connect both, equalization requests and
integration statements. To sum up, although the access of Turkish migrant associations to the
public construction of definitions is limited, some of them, especially political and business
associations, manage to redefine public integration requests and simultaneously to position
themselves as both ‘Non-foreign’ and ‘Other’.
Las asociaciones de migrantes turcos en Alemania: entre la presión de la
integración y las vinculaciones transnacionales
Anna AMELINA y Thomas FAIST
En contraposición a la afirmación de que las actividades político-transnacionales de las
organizaciones de migrantes dependen principalmente de las condiciones marco institucionales
de los estados nacionales, el presente artículo parte del supuesto de que las prácticas
transnacionales de las organizaciones de migrantes se ven también influenciadas por la manera
en que ellas relacionan sus orientaciones transnacionales con las exhortaciones a integrarse.
Por consiguiente, el artículo atiende a la pregunta sobre de qué manera las organiza-
ciones de migrantes transnacionalmente orientadas conviven con la presión a integrarse. Este
problema ha sido examinado tomando como ejemplo a las organizaciones religiosas, políticas y
económicas de las asociaciones turcas en Alemania. Los resultados de la investigación aquí
presentados se basan en el supuesto de que integración es un complejo campo discursivo en el
que las asociaciones de migrantes ocupan una posición específica de portavoz. Se constató que
todas las asociaciones examinadas conllevan la presión a integrarse de manera claramente
distinta, si bien es cierto que todas participan de los debates sobre integración. Las asociaciones
religiosas de los sunitas por ejemplo, tienen dificultades con la representación pública de sus
conexiones transnacionales, como consecuencia del discurso global sobre el terrorismo, mientras
que asociaciones de migrantes políticas y económicas dan a conocer públicamente sus
orientaciones transnacionales presentándolas bajo una luz positiva. Esto tiene que ver por otro
lado, con el hecho de que sus actividades están dirigidas a lograr una así llamada política de
identidad, cuyos principios elementales encuentran un gran reconocimiento en la agenda de los
estados nacionales. Así mismo, estas asociaciones relacionan sus reivindicaciones de igualdad
para los migrantes hacienda incapié de sus vínculos transnacionales. En resumen se puede decir
que a pesar de que el acceso de asociaciones de migrantes turcas a los procesos de definiciones
sociales es limitado, son principalmente las asociaciones políticas y económicas las que logran
una nueva interpretación de las exhortaciones públicas a integrarse. Por lo tanto, ellas mismas se
posicionan en el discurso de integración como los actores que al mismo tiempo ocupan dos
posiciones sociales: Los “culturalmente distintos”, como también los “no foráneos” en la
sociedad alemana de inmigración. 
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